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I. 
STATEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTION 
The original issue presented on appeal was whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 
(recently recodified as 78B-3-404) is subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 
(recently recodified as 78B-2-104).1 In this Court's February 2, 2009, Order, the Court 
requested that the parties submit supplemental briefs on the following question: 
In what way, if any, does the language of 78-12-35 limit its 
application to the provisions of 78-14-4? 
Therefore, Defendant Dr. Grigsby provides the following supplemental brief to assist this 




Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, which codifies the tolling effect of a defendant's 
absence from the state on an applicable statute of limitation, was amended in 1987. The 
Utah Legislature substituted more specific language, highlighted below, to indicate that 
the tolling effect of an absence from the state is limited to statutory terms of limitation 
contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78: 
Appellant notes that the Legislature has recodified Title 78, a change that went 
into effect on February 7, 2008. Because the renumbering does not change the analysis 
below, and because any substantive changes do not apply to this analysis, Appellant will 
cite to the version of Title 78 that was cited by the parties in their briefs and in this 
Court's February 2, 2009, Order. See Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, n. 2. 
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Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is 
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term 
as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If 
after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the 
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 clearly 
limits the tolling effect of an absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation 
contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78. The two-year statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions, which is codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, is not a statute of 
limitations contained within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78. Therefore, pursuant to 
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, an action against a health care provider 
is not tolled during the care provider's absence from the state of Utah. 
Based on the applicable legal standard as applied to undisputed facts, the district 
court did not err when it determined as a matter of law that the "Plaintiffs' claim against 
Dr. Grigsby is time-barred on its face." R. 859. "[W]e may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) (citing Hill v. Seattle First Nat 7 
Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992)). 
A. 
The Plain Language of Section 78-12-35 Restricts the Tolling Effect of an Absence 
From the State to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained Within 
Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that "Utah has developed an extensive 
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statutory scheme addressing the limitations of actions See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
12-1 to 78-12-48 (2002)." Beaver County v. Property TaxDiv. of the Utah State Tax 
Comm % 2006 UT 6, \ 37,128 P.3d 1187. In other words, these statutes, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-1 to 78-12-48, constitute "an extensive statutory scheme addressing the 
limitations of actions." However, the extensive statutory scheme addressing the 
limitations of actions found in chapter 12 of Title 78 is not exhaustive. The Legislature 
has also established statute of limitations for certain specific civil actions, including the 
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice causes of action found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4. As this Court recently indicated: 
It is the Legislature's prerogative to set statutes of limitation. 
It is also the Legislature's prerogative to set the terms by 
which a statute will be tolled. 
Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, ^ 21, 158 P.3d 532. Within the "extensive statutory 
scheme addressing the limitations of actions" of Chapter 12 of Title 78, the Utah 
Legislature has included several statutory methods for tolling statutes of limitation. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-35 to 78-12-41. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 
provides for the tolling effect of a person's absence from the state: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is 
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term 
as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If 
after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the 
time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of Section 78-12-35 confines the tolling effect of 
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an absence from the state to statutory terms "as limited by this chapter." In other words, 
the tolling of a statute of limitations as a result of a defendant's absence from the state is 
"limited" to the statutory scheme addressing the limitations of actions found in chapter 12 
of Title 78, i.e., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-1 to 78-12-48. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that the "first step in any statutory 
interpretation is to examine the plain meaning of the statute." Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, 
K 10, 191 P.3d 4. To ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, the court interprets each 
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning: 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning. 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, f^ 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original) (emphasis added). 
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (1969) defines the term "limited" as follows: 
"Narrow, restricted, circumscribed, inclosed within a certain limit; hemmed in; confined; 
bounded." The court in Cheyney v. Smith, 3 Ariz. 143, 155 (Ariz. 1890), defined the term 
"limited" similarly: 
The word 'limited' means narrow, restricted. It is 
synonymous with the word 'circumscribe'; and that word 
means to inclose within a certain limit; to hem in; to confine; 
to bound; to limit; to restrict, etc. 
According to the plain meaning of "limited," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 provides that 
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the tolling effect of a defendant's absence from the state is confined or restricted to the 
statutory terms or statute of limitations contained within "this chapter," chapter 12 of 
Title 78: "Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his 
return to the state." (Emphasis added.) 
Although the second sentence in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 does not contain the 
same express limitation, it is clearly implied that the tolling effect of a defendant's 
absence from the state is confined or restricted to statutory terms or statute of limitations 
contained within "this chapter," chapter 12, regardless of whether the person was out of 
the state when the cause of action accrued or the person was out of the state after the 
cause of action accrued. As the Utah Supreme Court pointed out: 
It is to be observed, moreover, that statutory enactments are to 
be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which 
render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). It would be nonsensical 
and illogical to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 to limit the tolling effect of a 
defendant who is absent from the state if the defendant happens to be outside of the state 
when the cause of action accrues, but if the defendant leaves the state the day after the 
cause of action accrues, the same limitation would not apply. 
Plaintiffs may argue that if the tolling effect of absence from the state pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 is restricted to Chapter 12 of Title 78, then Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-12-1 expands the scope of Chapter 12 to include "specific cases where a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute," such as Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. However, such an 
expansion would be contrary to the general rules of statutory construction. The Utah 
Supreme Court has pointed out: 
When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the 
same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as 
to which applies. In doing this, we follow the general rules of 
statutory construction, which provide both that 'the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the 
statute,' and that 'a more specific statute governs instead of a 
more general statute.' 
Jensen v. IHCHosps., 944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). The plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 clearly indicates that "the action may be 
commenced within the term as limited by this chapter." In other words, the tolling effect 
of absence from the state is restricted to statutory terms of limitation contained within 
"this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78. Similarly, the more specific statute dealing with 
restrictions on the tolling effect of absence from the state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, 
governs instead of the more general statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1, that does not 
specifically address the tolling effect of absence from the state. In addition, these two 
statutes, 78-12-35 and 78-12-1, can be read to be consistent with one another regarding 
the fact that 78-12-35 is to be limited to application to only statutes of limitation in 
Chapter 12 of Title 78. During oral argument before this Court on February 2, 2009, 
Justice Michael J. Wilkins indicated that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 "would appear by 
its own language to be limited to application to only statutes of limitation in Chapter 12," 
-6-
while pointing out that the medical malpractice statute of limitations is not in Chapter 12 
of Title 78, concluding: 
Because if you look earlier in Chapter 12, time for 
commencement of actions generally, in what's now 78B-2-
102 [formerly 78-12-1], it says, 'Civil actions may be 
commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases 
where a different limitation is prescribed by statute.' Now 
one could read with consistency the proposition that the . . . 
what used to be Chapter 12 applies to Chapter 12 and that 
would lend some credence to the proposition that the medical 
malpractice limitation was intended to be a creature of an 
entirely different nature. 
(Utah Supreme Court On-Demand Oral Arguments, 
http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/streams/index.cgi?mon=:::20092, February 2, 2009 — 
Arnold v. Grigsby 20080255, Justice Michael J. Wilkins speaking). The plain language 
of Section 78-12-35 indicates that the tolling effect of absence from the state is limited in 
application to only statutes of limitation in Chapter 12 of Title 78, and the "medical 
malpractice limitations was intended to be a creature of an entirely different nature." 
B. 
The Legislative History of Section 78-12-35 Indicates that the Utah Legislature 
Added More Specific Language to Clarify that the Tolling Effect of an Absence 
From the State Would Be Limited to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained 
Within Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, "The evolution of a statute through 
amendment by the Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended meaning." 
Olseth, 2007 UT 29 at \ 23. The Court went on to point out that the Utah Legislature has 
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not significantly amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 since it was originally enacted: 
"Utah Code section 78-12-35 does not differ materially from its original version enacted 
in 1872." Id. at % 16. However, in 1987, the Utah Legislature made a significant change 
to the statute. The previous version of section 78-12-35 did not expressly restrict the 
tolling effect of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation contained within 
Chapter 12 of Title 78: 
If when a cause of action accrues against a person when he is 
out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term 
herein limited after his return to the state; and if after a cause 
of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1953) (emphasis added). In 1987, the Utah Legislature 
substituted "as limited by this chapter" for the phrase "herein limited" in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-35. Therefore, the Utah Legislature added more specific language to 
section 78-12-35 to clearly indicate that the tolling effect of an absence from the state 
would be limited to statutory terms of limitation contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
A review of the Utah Code indicates that such a restriction would have impacted 
ten (10) statutes of limitation that were contained outside of Chapter 12 of Title 78 prior 
to 1987.2 The defendants in these non-Chapter 12 statutes of limitations included bars 
2Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-19-8 (enacted in 1981); 32A-14a-102 (enacted in 1985); 
63G-3-603 (enacted in 1985); 63G-3-817 (enacted in 1980); 70A-2-725 (enacted in 
1965); 70C-7-205 (enacted in 1985); 75-3-108 (enacted in 1975); 75-3-802 (enacted in 
1975); 76-10-925 (enacted in 1979); and 78B-3-404 (enacted in 1976). 
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and stores that sold a.coho, (32A-14a-102), state agencies (63G-3-603 and 63G-3-817), 
retailers (70A-2-725), credit card companies (70C-7-205), an estate (75-3-802), and meta, 
deaiers (76-10-925). None of these statutes oflimitations would seem to have been 
direct* impacted by limiting the tolling effect of absence from the state as defendants 
t h a t are no, natural persons are generally static. Utah Code Ann. , 75-3-108 deals with 
statute of limitations on a decedent's cause(s) of actions, but Utah Code Ann. S 78B-2-
105 already tolls the statute of limitations in the case of death. 
Arguably, the only individual defendants directly impacted by limiting the tolling 
effects of absence from the state to Chapter .2 of Title 78 wouid have been health care 
provider defendants under Utah Code Ann. § § 26-19-8 and 78-14-4 (the statute at issue in 
to appeal). However, the Utah Supreme Court pointed ou, that the Utah Legislature 
purposefully chose to treat health care providers differently than other defendants: "The 
avowed legislativepurpose for treating the Cass of health providers differently from other 
defendants is stated in the Act itself." Alien v. InKrmounlaln Heakh Care, 635 P.2d 30, 
3 1 .32 (Utah ,981). The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that "we ha-ve] no need 
t o speculate as to what purposes the Malpractice Act was intended to serve because the 
<,, forth in 5 78-14-2." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993). purposes were set forth in 9 '° •* 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted: 
According to its own provisions, the purpose of the UHCMA 
C o 'Provide a reasonable time in which actions may be 
o l e n c e d against health care providers while mUmg that 
nrrTo a specific period for which professional liability 
-9-
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately 
calculated.' Id §78-14-2. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, H 30, 70 P.3d 904 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, in Dowling v. Bullen, the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that the 
purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to ease health care costs by 
establishing a specific window of time to bring malpractice actions: 
However, the stated purpose of the UHCMA is to alleviate health 
care costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time "in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers[,] while 
limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability 
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." 
Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, \ 11, 94 P.3d 915. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2, 
"Legislative findings and declarations - Purpose of act," provides: 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims 
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising 
from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of 
these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the 
cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased 
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care 
cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of 
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing 
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential 
adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are 
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high 
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating 
the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's 
health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by 
enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance 
companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice 
insurance while at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure 
the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable 
-10-
from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide 
a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period 
for which professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other 
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (emphasis added). The clear intent of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act was to treat health care provider defendants differently than other 
defendants. 
Therefore, the Utah Legislature's decision to exclude health care provider 
defendants from the tolling effect of an absence from the state by limiting the application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 to statutes of limitations contained within Chapter 12 of 
Title 78 is clearly in keeping with the Utah Legislature's expressed intent in enacting the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to limit the statutory term for bringing a malpractice 
action to a specific period of time. The tolling effect of a health care defendant's absence 
from the state would create a potentially limitless time for bringing a medical malpractice 
action and thwart the expressly stated purpose and intent of the Legislature in enacting a 
statute of limitations specifically for health care providers. 
It is also important to remember that any health care provider defendant who 
leaves the state is still subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Utah's 
long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24: 
Utah's long-arm statute was enacted in 1969. It allows Utah's 
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courts to exert personal jurisdiction over any person, whether 
or not a resident of Utah, if that person committed any of the 
acts enumerated in the statute. The long-arm provisions apply 
'so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the 
fullest extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
The provisions allow service of process pursuant to rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on any party outside the 
state. 
Olseth, 2007 UT 29 at % 19. Consequently, this Court has pointed out that Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-35 is of limited utility: 
Basically, the tolling statute was designed to address a 
problem that no longer exists and the statute is, in that sense, 
an anachronism. Despite the fact that the tolling statute is 
anachronistic, however, it is clear, and it provides that a 
statute is tolled during that period where a defendant is absent 
from the state. 
Id. at TJ 13. The "anachronistic" nature of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 further argues for 
reasonably interpreting the plain language of this statute to limit its scope to exclude 
health care provider defendants whose statutory term of limitation is not contained within 
Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
It is also important to note that the other tolling statutes contained in Chapter 12 of 
Title 78 do not contain any express or implied limitation to statutory terms of limitation 
contained within the chapter. These tolling statutes include the effect of death, war, and 
disability-minority or legal incompetence-on statutory terms of limitation. In fact, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-36 was amended in the same senate bill that amended Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-35 in 1987. Although the Legislature included the new language, "as 
-12-
limited by this chapter," in the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, no such 
limitation was included in the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36, which 
provides: 
A person may not bring an action while under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent without a legal guardian. 
During the time the person is underage or incompetent, the 
statute of limitations for a cause of action other than for the 
recovery of real property may not run. 
In other words, the exclusion of this phrase from other tolling statutes reinforces the 
interpretation that the Utah Legislature pointedly determined to restrict the tolling effects 
of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation "limited by this chapter," 
Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
C 
Since Section 78-12-35 Was Amended in 1987, Utah Courts Have Only Applied the 
Tolling Effect of Absence from the State to Statutory Terms of Limitation Contained 
Within Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
The case law dealing directly with the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 
since the statute was amended in 1987 is in harmony with an interpretation that restricts 
the tolling effects of absence from the state to statutory terms of limitation contained 
within Chapter 12 of Title 78. There have been four cases that have directly addressed 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 since the statute was amended in 1987. In Olseth v. Larson, 
the plaintiff filed a claim for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights violation. Olseth, 2007 UT 
29 at ^ 6. The Reconstruction Civil Rights Act did not contain a statute of limitations for 
a section 1983 action. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that "section 1983 
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claims were best characterized as tort actions for the recovery of damages for personal 
injuries and federal courts must borrow the statute of limitations governing personal 
injury actions in the state in which the section 1983 action was brought." Banks v. City of 
Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-
76 (1985)). In Utah, the "statute of limitations for filing a personal injury action is four 
years. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 805 (Utah 
1998). Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations in Olseth was Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25, which is clearly a statute of limitations within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of 
Title 78. The Utah Supreme Court concluded: "We hold that section 78-12-35 does toll 
the applicable statute of limitations when a person against whom a claim has accrued has 
left the state of Utah." Id. at J^ 40 (emphasis in original). 
In Lundv. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997), the plaintiff claimed physical injuries 
as a result of an automobile collision: 
On January 12, 1989, plaintiff Rallet C. Lund and defendant 
Eldon W. Hall were allegedly involved in an automobile 
collision, whereby Hall hit a vehicle from behind, which in 
turn hit Lund's vehicle from behind causing her physical 
injuries. 
Id. at 285. The same statute of limitations provision applied where the court said that the 
"statute of limitations for filing a personal injury action is four years. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 805 (Utah 1998). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25 is clearly a statute of limitations within Chapter 12 of Title 78. In Lund, the 
Utah Supreme Court concluded: "Even if Hall had departed from the state, he was still 
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subject to service of process pursuant to the nonresident motor vehicle act. Thus, under 
our decision in Snyder, section 78-12-35 would not operate to toll the statute of 
limitations on this action." Id. at 290. 
In York v. Gardiner, 2006 UT App 471, the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that 
the "district court held that York's claims were barred by Utah Code section 78-12-25(3), 
the applicable statute of limitations." Id. at ^ 1. As noted above, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-25 is a statute of limitations within Chapter 12 of Title 78. The Utah Court of Appeals 
concluded: "The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that section 
78-12-35 did not apply because Gardiner was at all times amenable to service of process 
pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute." Id. at J^ 5. 
Finally, in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the Utah 
Court of Appeals pointed out that "Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment 
claiming that the suit was barred by the eight year's statute of limitations set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-22 (1984)." Id. at 112. The issue was whether "the statute of 
limitations was tolled when defendant was out of the state for both personal and business 
reasons even though he was amenable to service of process under Utah R. Civ. P. 4." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Id. at 113. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 is similarly a statute of 
limitations within "this chapter," Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
Each of the cases that have dealt directly with the applicability of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-35 since the statute was amended in 1987 is in harmony with a statutory 
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interpretation that restricts the tolling effects of absence from the state to statutes of 
limitation contained within Chapter 12 of Title 78. 
D. 
Limiting the Application of the Tolling Effect for Absence From the State in Section 
78-12-35 to Statutes of Limitation Contained Within Chapter 12 of Title 78 
Minimizes the Potential Constitutional Conflict with the Commerce Clause. 
Although the issue of whether the tolling statute, Section 78-12-35, 
unconstitutionally violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is not 
directly before this Court, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and its progeny, underscore 
the potential constitutional infirmities of the issue of whether the language of Section 78-
12-35 limits its application to the provisions of Section 78-14-4. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated, "we have ca duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to 
effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or 
infirmities.'" State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). This Court should construe 
the statutory phrase, "the action may be commended within the term as limited by this 
chapter," to exclude statutory terms outside of Chapter 12 of Title 78 generally, and the 
statutory term of limitations contained within Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 specifically, so 
as to avoid a conflict with the Commerce Clause in matters involving the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act and limit potential conflicts with the Commerce Clause generally. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as the reasons set forth in the Appellant's 
other briefs, the Defendant/Appellant Dr. Grigsby respectfully requests that the Utah 
Supreme Court reverse the judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals and determine that 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 is not subject to tolling under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 and 
uphold the summary judgment of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 2009. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE, LLC 
Daniel R. Harper 
Attorneys for David Grigsby, M.D. 
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